Community organizers in HPSISContributing to tertiary development
Consulting to build agency capabilities
Compromise and reformism
Abstract: The Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) helped the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works to develop and institutionalize methods for turning over small irrigation systems to water user associations. A series of pilot studies strengthened LP3ES' capability and explored ways to improve participation in irrigation design, construction and management. For turnover, LP3ES trained irrigation staff who worked with farmers, trained trainers, provided consultants to provincial irrigation services and collaborated in drafting regulations and manuals. Conditions for collaboration in institutional innovation included willingness to compromise, mutual trust, funding linkages and educated opportunism.
Government agencies, donors and researchers are paying increasing attention to the potential contributions of non-government organizations (NGOs) to developing new agricultural technologies and supplementing government research and extension efforts (Wellard, Farrington and Davies 1990, Farrington and Biggs 1990). The Indonesian program to turn over small irrigation systems to water user associations shows how an NGO can go beyond being an intermediary between government and farmers and instead help a government agency change its standard operating procedures in order to recognize and enhance the roles farmers can play in irrigation management.
Irrigation water is an essential resource for Indonesian farmers who depend on irrigation to grow two or three crops a year, often on one-third of a hectare of land or less per household. Farmers originally built and managed most small irrigation systems as local common property. During the 1970s and 1980s the government made massive investments in irrigation infrastructure, to improve the welfare of rural people and attain national self-sufficiency in rice production. The government often built or improved irrigation systems with little or no local participation, failing to take advantage of local knowledge and sometimes disrupting previously effective patterns of irrigation management. Government involvement in the operation and maintenance of small irrigation systems tended to ignore or undermine existing local institutions for water management. The goal of the turnover program is to reverse this process and turn over control of irrigation systems to farmers.
One of the organizations involved in formulating and implementing turnover is an Indonesian non-governmental organization. The Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) was founded in 1971 by a group of activist Indonesian intellectuals concerned about widespread poverty, lack of attention to basic rights and the dearth of institutions active in social and economic development. The government which came to power in the mid 1960s had consolidated and abolished many political parties and restricted the scope for political activism. The birth of LP3ES coincided with the government's first five-year plan, which relied on a centralized, technocratic and top-down approach to development.
LP3ES' founders sought to promote the advancement of social science knowledge for development. They wanted to train young people to become key actors in development. They hoped to create an alternative model of development capable of mobilizing popular participation. The Frederich Naumann Stiftung, a German NGO, provided financial and technical help for ten years to help LP3ES achieve these objectives.
In the 1970s LP3ES worked in several fields including development activities based on religious schools, people's handicrafts and integrated community development. LP3ES carried out field research and distributed information through training, forums and publication in journals and books, especially its journal, Prisma. Community development became a vehicle to try out models in a learning process together with the people. Government organizations could then disseminate new approaches in wider and more effective ways. One example was work with the Ministry of Industry which led to the adoption of Technical Service Centers to assist small industries.
***... an NGO can go beyond being an intermediary between government and farmers and instead help a government agency change its standard operating procedures in order to recognize and enhance the roles farmers can play in irrigation management. ... ***
With a staff of over one hundred people LP3ES is now a relatively large NGO in Indonesian terms. LP3ES is an example of what David Korten (1987) refers to as a third generation NGO. It directs its efforts not simply at relief or local community development but at working with and seeking to change government activities. Transferring management of small irrigation systems back to farmers contains elements of a fourth generation strategy to expand the role of peoples' organizations in development (Korten 1990).
Beginning in the mid 1970s, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the Sederhana (Simple) irrigation systems project to rapidly build irrigation systems in previously unirrigated areas. Over time the project included more and more sites which already had existing farmer-built irrigation systems. However, the project designed and built irrigation systems with little attention to existing irrigation systems and little consultation with farmers.
Researchers from Gajah Mada University who studied project sites concluded that farmers took little responsibility for operation and maintenance of irrigation systems because government-built systems did not meet their needs. Furthermore, farmers felt the systems belonged to the government and according to government regulations, systems built or improved by the government did belong to the government. The researchers recommended that farmers be involved in the planning and implementation of new irrigation development.
To bring about farmers' involvement, the Ministry of Agriculture invited LP3ES to work in pilot projects in seven provinces to combine technical and social aspects of irrigation development. This was the first of a series of projects through which LP3ES strengthened its capability to collaborate with government in irrigation development. USAID and the Ford Foundation provided funding for HPSIS.
The key element of the socio-technical approach was using community organizers (COs) in every stage of irrigation development, as pioneered in the Philippines (Korten and Siy 1989). Before both HPSIS and the Madiun project, large delegations of Public Works officials visited the Philippines. COs in the HPSIS project lived among the farmers for two to three years and worked as motivators, catalysts, organizers and mediators between farmers and government agencies.
In the project LP3ES recruited, trained and monitored the organizers and facilitated workshops with government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Home Affairs participated in the pilot project.
*** ... This was the first of a series of projects through which LP3ES strengthened its capability to collaborate with government in irrigation development. ...***
The results of the project showed that COs had more impact and farmers did more to improve irrigation canals on their own if they participated in designing improvements. Most of the decisions which farmers wanted to influence concerned design and construction and came under the authority of Public Works.
HPSIS gave LP3ES its first experience organizing farmers for natural resource management. LP3ES' performance in recruiting, training and supervising community organizers helped establish the credibility of LP3ES in the eyes of Public Works officials and donors.
HPSIS focused on "simple" irrigation systems. During the first and the second five-year plans the government had also built dams and main and secondary canals for larger "technical" irrigation systems. The government expected farmers to build tertiary canals. However, few tertiaries were built and so in the third plan the government decided to assist farmers.
The Directorate of Irrigation II, Ministry of Public Works, invited three institutions to collaborate in a pilot project funded by the Ford Foundation from 1981 to 1986 in Madiun, East Java. These were Gajah Mada University, for hydrology; Satya Wacana University, for social research; and LP3ES, as trainer and monitor of the COs. The three met monthly, with Directorate Irrigation II as coordinator, to discuss problems in the field, alternative solutions and follow-up actions.
LP3ES recruited COs to live and work with farmers. The farmers not only contributed ideas in planning and construction but they also had to invest in construction of tertiary canals. The COs helped farmers in preparing their contribution to the project. COs also attended the working group meetings, where they could develop perspective on field problems.
The Madiun project combined agency, NGO and university in pioneering new approaches to construction of tertiary canals. Working group meetings were a key tool for collaboration. Together with HPSIS, the Madiun project helped built up a cadre of community organizers and of more senior LP3ES staff familiar with irrigation development.
*** ...The farmers not only contributed ideas in planning and construction but they also had to invest in construction of tertiary canals. The COs helped farmers in preparing their contribution to the project. ... ***
Indonesian farmers have built and managed small irrigation systems using local resources for many centuries. However, little information was available about traditional irrigation systems. Beginning in 1982 the Ford Foundation funded three provincial universities to undertake research on traditional irrigation and the implications of government intervention.
One of the main problems highlighted by the research was that government assistance changed the status of traditional irrigation systems to become government irrigation systems. Project workshops concluded that ways should be found for the government to provide assistance without changing the management or ownership of the irrigation systems. Subsequently, the universities took part in action research on creating federations of water users, and procedures for government assistance to traditional irrigation systems.
*** ... One of the main problems highlighted by the research was that government assistance changed the status of traditional irrigation systems to become government irrigation systems. ... ***
LP3ES helped monitor the study and facilitate workshops at the provincial and national level. LP3ES prepared for workshops, arranging schedules, written materials and invitations. LP3ES mediated between government officials and university researchers to help interpret sensitive research results so that they would be accepted and would provide an agenda for change.
A 1984 Presidential Decree laid out a policy framework for development of water user associations (WUA). However, many government officials, including participants in the projects discussed above, felt a need for a more refined policy. The Ministry of Home Affairs in collaboration with LP3ES conducted a study of the roles and functions of WUA from 1986-1990 in five provinces. The National Planning Board, Provincial Planning Boards, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Public Works took part in the project.
The researchers involved government officials from the beginning of the project in determining research questions and methods. Field researchers wrote case studies as material for policy dialogue meetings at provincial and central level. The problems and issues noted by field researchers were analyzed together with LP3ES. A wider group of government officials and university researchers then attended forums at which they discussed the findings.
The project helped show that after WUA were formed only a small proportion continued to be active. Workshops and seminars concluded that WUA needed to be able to obtain formal legal status so they could enter into contracts, open bank accounts and take other legal action. Workshop participants continued a debate about whether WUA should be based on hydrological units, i.e., farmers receiving water from the same source, or based on village administrative boundaries.
In this project LP3ES carried out a new role as facilitator for an inter-ministerial study and helped transmit results from the provinces back to the center. The methods used by the project helped to build a consensus on the need to give WUA stronger status.
*** ... Workshops and seminars concluded that WUA needed to be able to obtain formal legal status so they could enter into contracts, open bank accounts and take other legal action. ... ***
Over the course of the 1980s LP3ES built up experience and credibility in dealing with the institutional aspects of irrigation development (Tobing 1989, Dilts, et al. 1988). LP3ES staff developed a network of contacts and shared experience with irrigation officials at the national and provincial levels and with university researchers. Action research, process documentation, working groups, policy dialogue and other techniques were refined as means for collaborating in the development of methods for involving farmers in the design, construction and management of irrigation systems.
The series of projects demonstrated the continuing strength of local irrigation institutions. Pilot activities adapted and refined methods to involve farmers in design and construction. Participation yielded designs better suited to local conditions, with less waste, and a greater sense of farmer ownership of the resulting systems. The pilot projects also showed that organizational efforts were more effective if combined with construction.
The drop in oil prices in the mid 1980s created a fiscal crisis for the Indonesian government. The construction-oriented strategy of irrigation development was no longer feasible. It had become progressively harder to find good sites to build new irrigation systems. At the same time many existing systems were poorly maintained. The government had improved or built many small irrigation schemes, creating an expanding burden for government operation and maintenance.
A World Bank review of the irrigation subsector in Indonesia stressed the need to give a greater priority to operation and maintenance. This included the question of how to improve operation and maintenance of the many small scattered irrigation systems.
Discussions among the National Planning Board (BAPPENAS), Public Works, the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, LP3ES and others developed the idea of having the government establish a policy to turn over all irrigation systems smaller than 500 hectares to farmer water user associations. Such small government systems cover a total area of over one million hectares out of some four million hectares irrigated by government irrigation systems in Indonesia.
With strong support from the World Bank the government established this policy as part of the planning for the World Bank-funded Irrigation Subsector Project (ISSP) and the Asian Development Bank's Third Irrigation Sector Project. Turnover was intended to create a better division of responsibility in irrigation management, making use of local capacity to manage small irrigation systems while focusing government resources where financial or technical help was most necessary including macro issues such as river basin management.
The Directorate of Irrigation I (DOI-1), Directorate General of Water Resources Development (DGWRD) of the Ministry of Public Works had primary responsibility for planning, budgeting, coordinating and supervising implementation of turnover. The provincial irrigation services (PRIS), part of provincial government, were responsible for implementation.
*** ... a policy to turn over all irrigation systems smaller than 500 hectares to farmer water user associations. ... ***
Turnover was only one component of the Irrigation Subsector Project. Most of ISSP focused on repairing medium and large scale irrigation systems and improving operations and maintenance. Most components had consultant support, usually through a team made up of both foreign and local consulting companies. LP3ES was the only NGO involved.
Turnover was a new activity which required training staff in new approaches and developing and refining new methods. The Ford Foundation provided funds for DOI-1 to contract with LP3ES as social and institutional consultants. Through the end of 1989 the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) conducted research and made recommendations concerning the turnover process. From May 1990 through May 1991 the Institute for Agrobusiness Development was responsible for research and documentation of turnover, using staff from Andalas and Padjadjaran universities who had worked in IIMI's research. Engineers from government-owned consulting companies assisted the PRIS in the design and construction of improvements. As an NGO, LP3ES was one actor along with an international research institute, national universities and multiple levels of government.
A working group formed in 1987 to devise a framework for turnover, bringing together staff from DOI-1, the Ford Foundation, IIMI and LP3ES. The group laid out a process which drew heavily on the approaches developed in the pilot projects discussed above. The process uses a series of activities to prepare farmers and irrigation systems for turnover (Murray-Rust and Vermillion 1989, Bruns and Dwi Atmanto n.d., Judawinata 1991).
PRIS staff identify potential sites based on existing records and their own knowledge. PRIS field staff, called TP4, collect information and work with farmers. Their roles are similar to the institutional organizers and community organizers used in other irrigation projects in Asia (Manor, Patamatamkul and Olin, eds. 1990). The TP4 attend a series of four training courses: inventory; profile and WUA development; design and construction; and preparation for turnover.
Field staff first inventory a system to collect basic information on physical condition, current management and past government construction assistance. TP4 then gather more detailed information profiling system conditions, management and problems. They begin to work with farmers to develop the water user association if one already exists or otherwise to form a new one.
The TP4 help farmers prepare design requests, which are then integrated with technical design considerations to produce final designs. The PRIS or contractors build the improvements in the following budget year. They hire local labor and purchase materials locally as much as possible.
*** ... The process uses a series of activities to prepare farmers and irrigation systems for turnover ... ***
The TP4 works with farmers to prepare for farmer operation and maintenance of the system. The government then formally turns over system assets and authority for operation and maintenance to the water user association.
This process was elaborated and refined as the project continued. LP3ES played several roles in developing the process for turnover and strengthening the capability of the government to carry out turnover.
Perhaps the most conventional role LP3ES played in the turnover program was that of trainer, though having an NGO responsible for training government officials was itself new and unusual. Agency officials could relatively easily understand and accept this role of training TP4 and it provided an entry into other activities. As trainer, LP3ES could directly contribute to changes which would enable local organizations to play a stronger role in development.
LP3ES had trained community change agents to work in urban and rural areas since the 1970s. The training methods in the pilot projects continued earlier approaches, particularly the emphasis on making trainees active, aware participants in learning.
During the first full budget year of turnover, LP3ES directly organized training of the TP4. During subsequent years the PRIS had primary responsibility for training, with LP3ES acting as a consultant. LP3ES provincial consultants remained heavily involved in planning and implementing training. In particular they continued to play a major role in training sessions dealing with social issues such as WUA development. In 1989 and 1990, LP3ES wrote training materials and conducted courses to prepare provincial officials to carry out training.
*** ... Agency officials could relatively easily understand and accept this role of training TP4 and it provided an entry into other activities. ... ***
Training provided an easily understood entry role for LP3ES. But even in the HPSIS project it had been clear that training alone was not sufficient. Implementing a participatory approach required new procedures, many of which could not be fully anticipated in advance and which often required decisions at senior levels. Even as a trainer LP3ES faced the issue of shifting from direct implementation to the role of consultant providing support and preparing for eventual phasing out its role.
Turnover activities began in late 1987 with pilot efforts at about seventy sites, in two provinces. In 1988 the project expanded to two more provinces. The basic pattern was that each province had a coordinator from LP3ES, supervised by a sociologist responsible for several provinces. The team leader and institutional advisor based in Jakarta took an active role in developing procedures. They also worked with the LP3ES trainer in preparing and conducting training.
Initially, coordinators frequently worked directly in the field in order to solve problems and show TP4 how to work with farmers. Almost all of the LP3ES staff had originally worked as community organizers in earlier projects. Some had later spent time as supervisors of community organizers. They were capable and comfortable working directly with farmers. Public Works officials appreciated this role. However, this level of intensive consultant assistance was not sustainable given the rate of expansion the project faced and not consistent with the goal of strengthening agency capabilities. The reason for having consultants was not simply to supplement the number of project staff but to help the government establish the capabilities needed to work with farmers in a participatory process on its own.
As time went on, the TP4 coordinators focused more of their attention at the province and section level, with less work directly in the field. When DOI-1 extended the contract with LP3ES in 1990 their title was changed from TP4 coordinators to provincial social and institutional consultants.
The provincial consultants' activities covered a broad scope. They helped plan program implementation; helped plan, organize and carry out training; participated in meetings at the province and section level; monitored the progress of implementation and helped troubleshoot problems as they occurred. They and their coworkers in the province tried to attend some key field activities such as meetings for design integration. The newness of the turnover activities made such support necessary, and formal training alone was clearly insufficient.
*** ... The reason for having consultants was not simply to supplement the number of project staff but to help the government establish the capabilities needed to work with farmers in a participatory process on its own. ... ***
In order to keep good relations with agency staff the consultants had to give a high priority to meeting targets while still keeping longer run goals in mind. They had to make choices about where to make the most effort. Some goals, such as participation in design, showed more progress and received more attention. For other goals, such as establishment of water user associations, the formal requirements were satisfied but circumstances made it difficult to do as much as might have been hoped to adapt the organizations to local conditions and implement a thorough bottom-up approach.
Public Works officials would have liked more help and would have used as much as was available. LP3ES' consultants in Jakarta and the provinces lived with a continuing tension between the short run goals of meeting program targets and the longer run goal of institutionalizing a participatory process of irrigation development and turnover.
The third role LP3ES played was in devising the methods for turnover. In turnover this development of methods took place not simply within a small pilot project but as part of the establishment of a large, and increasingly routine program.
Working groups included representatives from DOI-1, IIMI, Ford Foundation and LP3ES. At times, provincial irrigation service officials also took part. As the project evolved, working groups went through various transformations and became much more linked to formulating specific guidelines for activities.
The first guidelines prepared were the general outline for turnover. These were followed by more specific work on the inventory methods. The socio-technical profile underwent a similar process of pretesting and revision. However, by this time the project had already expanded beyond the initial pilot areas. For subsequent stages it was no longer possible to carefully pretest each stage.
A long series of meetings during 1989 eventually produced the Ministerial Ordinance on Implementing Guidelines for Turnover. The ordinance was formulated after field activities had allowed extensive testing, learning and refinement of many aspects of the turnover process.
DOI-1 and PRIS officials and LP3ES staff used the same collaborative approach to develop additional specific guidelines and manuals for turnover tasks, including manuals for preparing operations and maintenance guidelines for each system, design of irrigation system improvements and water user association formation and development.
Much time was spent in word by word revision of manuals and other documents, writing by committee. While seemingly inefficient, this process provided a forum for discussing many issues. The working group meetings maintained contact between those involved in the project. The process helped to build a sense of agency ownership. Materials were not simply produced by consultants and then ratified by the agency. Instead, agency staff played a major role in writing and extensively revising the manuals. The losses in short term efficiency were offset by advantages in terms of communication, cooperation and agency ownership of the results.
There was a genuine risk that much time would be spent compiling manuals which would never be read. However, agency officials strongly desired detailed guidelines on how to carry out turnover. Putting procedures into official manuals did constitute an important form of recognition of the importance placed on participation.
*** ... Much time was spent in word by word revision of manuals and other documents, writing by committee. While seemingly inefficient, this process provided a forum for discussing many issues. ... ***
Changing how government agencies work is not simply a matter of high policy decisions (D. Korten 1980, F. Korten 1987). LP3ES and the PRIS had to test and refine new procedures in the field and then discuss them with senior decisionmakers. Government staff were not just carrying out orders from above but acting as partners in creating something new enriched by their knowledge. Learning evolved in a cycle from policy to practice and back to policy. This collaborative process of learning institutionalized the new methods required for turnover.
What conditions made collaboration between an NGO and government agency possible? First, there were some pre-conditions, such as a political environment which was not actively hostile. LP3ES had gained experience with training and fielding community development workers on various other projects before starting irrigation activities. LP3ES' goals included strengthening the role of people's organizations in the development process. Government officials believed that LP3ES had relevant skills and LP3ES saw a chance to pursue its own goals, so both government officials and LP3ES were willing to try to work together.
First, and probably the most important condition for collaboration, is that it requires a decision by an NGO to work with the government, accepting an incremental reformist approach to change. Intellectually this is a more difficult position to maintain than simply standing on the outside and criticizing. Working together with government officials requires starting from existing conditions and trying to improve them. Philosophically it requires accepting the messy choices of reform, rather than hoping for revolution or radical transformation. Obviously the decision takes place under particular political conditions, which in the Indonesian case drastically limited the scope for alternative choices or more confrontational approaches.
Choosing to work collaboratively requires some sacrifices. It is difficult to combine a "work from within" approach with outspoken advocacy and criticism. This is particularly true since collaborating with an agency may give an NGO access to sensitive internal information about the agency. Creating a political scandal could easily poison cooperation with the agency. Tensions and conflicts will be common in the course of working with an agency. Relations with agency staff are likely to unravel unless there is a basic agreement on the need to make compromises and take a patient, reformist approach.
*** ... it requires accepting the messy choices of reform, rather than hoping for revolution or radical transformation. ... ***
This choice to work with government is in part one of temperament. There are fewer opportunities for the glory of media attention but perhaps more prospect of making substantive changes. Incentives for taking a reformist approach come from a view that even small changes in government practices can have a wide impact.
This is a judgment. Under some circumstances the decision may be that the prospects of success are too dismal or the compromises required too great and the better choice is not to cooperate. Even after cooperation has begun it may turn out not be feasible. However, it is probably better not to collaborate at all unless there is a willingness to take a reformist approach, accepting the need for compromise, learning and incremental change.
Creating and maintaining trust was an essential part of the process of working together. LP3ES staff had to be willing to work on the assumption that Public Works would follow through on its commitments. Public Works had to trust that LP3ES knew enough to make participation in irrigation development work. The long series of joint projects helped to gradually build mutual trust.
Sensitive issues kept arising. If Public Works was to listen to LP3ES' views then credibility was essential. Given ambiguities and incomplete information it was easy to take things out of context or make different interpretations of the same facts. The need was to create an interpretation of events which Public Works could agree with. This sometimes involved a process best described as negotiation. The issue was not to force the agency to agree with LP3ES but to find an interpretation which fit the available information while respecting the experience of Public Works officials. Based on such an agreed interpretation of events it might then be possible to draw conclusions and make changes.
*** ... The long series of joint projects helped to gradually build mutual trust. ... ***
Even internal reports to the agency required a degree of self-censorship. Many topics could only be freely addressed verbally. There was a high level of sensitivity to written reports. In conversation, much more could be acknowledged and solutions sought, making frequent NGO-agency interactions essential.
The need for sensitivity is linked to the sometimes huge gaps between policy and actual implementation. Working with an agency required recognizing the diversity of practices in various areas and looking for ways to make use of the creativity, flexibility and local initiative it represented rather than trying to impose a single top-down reform. The pace of change was a subject for continual negotiation. LP3ES was one of many influences in the continuing process of restructuring how the agency worked with farmers.
In irrigation activities in Indonesia the Ford Foundation chose to channel funding to LP3ES through the government. LP3ES' contracts with the government outlined its responsibilities, though in practice both sides needed substantial flexibility to respond to project needs without getting overly tied up in the details of what the contract specified. In the case of turnover the Ford Foundation also gave a parallel grant directly to LP3ES to strengthen its ability to carry out work in irrigation.
Ford Foundation funding was relatively flexible, without a heavy administrative overhead. A series of grants was made with each individual grant usually only lasting two or three years. The major grants were in the range of a few hundred thousand dollars, but there were also a number of much smaller grants to support specific activities. Over the course of about ten years several million dollars was spent on the irrigation activities, much of which was channeled through government agencies.
Ford Foundation staff spent a large amount of time on project activities. They kept in contact with officials at many levels. They took part in preparing contracts. They kept track of implementation and tried to ensure that financial and administrative problems did not impede progress. They spent much time going to the field, attending meetings and maintaining informal contacts, especially before meetings to help encourage a consensus so that meetings would be fruitful. Agency-NGO collaboration took place in the context of a very activist role on the part of the donor.
*** ... The funding structure clearly showed that the NGO was supposed to be responsive to government priorities. ... ***
Researchers helped learn about the implementation of turnover and improve the process. In contrast with other projects in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand which paired a research institution with an irrigation agency, the work in Indonesian brought together agency, research institutions and an NGO. Basing research and consulting in separate institutions created some overlap and tensions, but it encouraged a broader range of ideas about the project. Because the research organization's mandate included producing objective, publishable results, researchers' views remained somewhat distinct from those of agency and NGO staff caught up in the details of implementation. However, the sensitivity of agency officials concerning written statements and formal presentations on sensitive issues hampered communication and often made it difficult to take full advantage of research data and analysis.
Funding linkages forced the agency and NGO to keep in contact. The funding structure clearly showed that the NGO was supposed to be responsive to government priorities. However, since the money came from an outside source, government officials needed to stay responsive if they hoped to continue to receive such grants. The NGO could also appeal to the donor if problems occurred. This created a balance of interests which did not guarantee success but did establish basic incentives to cooperate.
Bureaucracies are not monolithic. Diverse individuals, divisions, sections, branches and subgroups have varying experiences, interests and priorities. This creates an opportunity to find allies. Coalition building was one of the elements of the process through which Ford Foundation, Public Works, universities and LP3ES worked together.
In the various projects some agency staff worked intensively to create new approaches, while many more took part in various workshops and seminars. Donor, NGO and agency staff identified people who for various reasons had an interest in a more participatory approach to irrigation development. Some of these people could be included in working groups and other activities. They talked, discussed and sought conclusions about how to make change feasible. The result was not unanimity on every issue but the creation of a coalition, a set of people with some shared goals about creating new approaches to irrigation development.
This process continued during the turnover project. Some people felt strong personal commitments. Others contributed because the project was part of their job. However, they were able to work together. Funding linkages in the form of contracts and flows of money reinforced and were reinforced by a network of personal relationships.
*** ... The result was not unanimity on every issue but the creation of a coalition, a set of people with some shared goals about creating new approaches to irrigation development. ... ***
This network has now survived a near total changeover in the actual people working on the project. Frances Korten of the Ford Foundation played a major role in formulating and implementing the projects, but the Ford Foundation program officer directly responsible for irrigation activities has changed several times, while activities have continued. LP3ES staff who led earlier phases have now shifted to other duties, while those currently involved began as junior field staff. Public Works officials have changed at the Director General, Director and subdirectorate level. New people need time to learn about project activities but a coalition seems able to persist, which is not simply dependent on one or two specific individuals. It does depend on having a group of people willing and able to invest sufficient energy in the project.
Turnover involved a range of issues. It had a broad goal of reversing government takeover of small irrigation systems. It had a fundamental concern that government recognize the special characteristics of small locally managed irrigation systems and develop appropriate policies. The program sought to institutionalize a participatory process of design and construction. It intended to strengthen water user associations. Given this multiplicity of goals, priorities had to be set and adjusted over time.
In hindsight it would be easy to miss these decisions, or to act as if the actual outcome was the only possibility. For example, the questions of whether to turn over assets or only management authority and whether to turn over the entire irrigation system or only the canal network were the subject of discussion in early phases of the project.
A study of the legal aspects of turnover helped to reassure Public Works' officials that turnover of assets was legally possible. Other studies showed that farmers already managed similar sized non-government systems. Farmers had de facto control of many "government" systems. They had been given the keys to operate gates and did all or almost all of the operations and maintenance work. This evidence supported the final decision to turn over complete systems, including assets as well as management authority, thus more clearly empowering WUA. However, the decision could have been only to turn over management authority.
The ownership right turned over was one of "temporary status." This was all that existing legislation authorized the Minister of Public Works to do. Government officials argued that this was sufficient for the time being. Intellectually this was ambiguous and less satisfying than a full transfer. However, it seemed unlikely that more could have been achieved. Pushing harder on this issue might have diverted effort from other goals. The hope is that government officials will eventually carry out a final determination of status.
*** ... NGO and donor staff and agency officials had to make choices about where the greatest potential existed for improving the role of local people in irrigation ... ***
Given the range of issues, NGO and donor staff and agency officials had to make choices about where the greatest potential existed for improving the role of local people in irrigation development. Project staff made these decisions in the context of limited information and much ambiguity. Poor decisions could result in wasting much effort for little gain. Conversely at times it was possible to make large gains with little effort.
Compromise, trust, coalition building and educated opportunism are particularly important in a political culture such as Indonesia's which stresses consensus oriented procedures for making decisions, rather than confrontational, adversarial processes. Nevertheless, if the goal is joint action by an NGO and government then these issues will probably be relevant in any country, to avoid the dangers of becoming trapped in sterile debates and mutual hostility, and to establish a context for productive cooperation.
The turnover program is an example of how an NGO can play a role in changing the ways a bureaucracy works with farmers. In this case an NGO played a major role in training agency staff, developing concepts and institutionalizing new methods. This is another demonstration that NGOs are not just limited to working directly with local communities but instead can work at multiple levels from farmers to national policy formulation.
The Turnover Program linked the NGO's concern with local organizations and the social aspects of development with the delivery of government technical and financial assistance. A series of projects evolved methods and demonstrated the feasibility of more participatory approaches. A specific program of technical assistance embodied methods for enabling participation and empowerment, providing short term assistance to repair and improve irrigation systems, improving government capacity to work with farmers in a participatory way and implementing a fundamental restructuring of government relations with local organizations.
*** ... innovators collaborating to develop new approaches and consultants helping institutionalize capabilities within agencies ... ***
NGOs have the advantages of flexibility, creativity, local knowledge and understanding of institutional issues. This suits them for a role as innovators collaborating to develop new approaches and consultants helping institutionalize capabilities within agencies. LP3ES' work in the project to turn over small irrigation systems to farmers is an illustration of how an NGO can accelerate research and development of institutional innovations in the ways government works with local organizations.
A shorter version of this paper was published in Overseas Development Institute Irrigation Management Network Paper 10 (April 1992): 25-38. The paper was presented at a workshop on NGO's, Natural Resources Management and Linkages with the Public Sector: Asia Regional Workshop, September 16-20, 1991, Hyderabad, India organized by the Overseas Development Institute, the Indian National Academy of Agricultural Research Management and the Administrative Staff College of India.
From November 1988 through June 1991 Bryan Bruns worked at LP3ES as Institutional Advisor to the Turnover Program.
Irchamni Soelaiman worked with LP3ES irrigation activities since the early 1980's and was team leader of LP3ES turnover consulting from 1987 through April 1990. His address is LP3ES, Jalan S. Parman No. 81, Slipi, Jakarta 11420 P.O. Box 1493 JKT Jakarta 10002 Indonesia (tel. 66-21 567-4211, fax (62-21 598-785).
The authors thank Suzanne Siskel and John Ambler for their assistance in preparing the paper. This paper was written as part of an activity "Reflections on Institutionalizing Participation in Irrigation Development" funded by the Ford Foundation at the Water Resources and Environment Institute of Khonkaen University, Khonkaen, Thailand. Views expressed in the paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of LP3ES or other organizations associated with the turnover program.
January 2, 1992. Revised May 23, 1992. [html 97-07.06]
Comments and questions regarding this paper should be directed to Bryan Bruns at 39/1 Ban Daun Ngeun, A. Pong, Phayao 56140 Thailand, or: BryanBruns@BryanBruns.com
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